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Abstract
The notion of belief likelihood function of re-
peated trials is introduced, whenever the un-
certainty for individual trials is encoded by a
belief measure (a finite random set). This gen-
eralises the traditional likelihood function, and
provides a natural setting for belief inference
from statistical data. Factorisation results are
proven for the case in which conjunctive or
disjunctive combination are employed, leading
to analytical expressions for the lower and up-
per likelihoods of ‘sharp’ samples in the case
of Bernoulli trials, and to the formulation of a
generalised logistic regression framework.
1 Introduction
Logistic regression [4] is a popular statistical method for
modelling data in which one or more independent ob-
served variables determine an outcome, represented by
a binary variable. The framework can also be extended
to the multinomial case, and is widely used in various
fields, including machine learning, medical diagnosis,
and social sciences, to cite a few. Despite its successes,
the method has serious limitations. In particular, it has
been shown to consistently and sharply underestimate the
probability of ‘rare’ events [19]. The term [25] denotes
cases in which the training data are of insufficient qual-
ity, in the sense that they do not represent well enough the
underlying distribution. As a result, scientists are forced
to infer probability distributions using information cap-
tured in ‘normal’ times (e.g. while a nuclear power plant
is working nominally), whereas these distributions are
later used to extrapolate results at the ‘tail’ of the curve.
Although corrections to logistic regression have been
proposed [19], the root cause of the problem, in our view,
our very models of uncertainty are themselves affected
by uncertainty: a phenomenon often called ‘Knightian’
uncertainty. The latter can be explicitly modelled by
considering convex sets of probability distributions, or
‘credal sets [24, 23]. Random sets [26, 27, 29, 15], in
particular, are a sub-class of credal sets induced by prob-
ability distributions on the collection of all subsets of
the sample space. In the finite case random sets are of-
ten called belief functions, a term introduced by Glenn
Shafer [28] from a subjective probability perspective.
As we show here, the logistic regression framework can
indeed be generalised to the case of belief functions,
which themselves generalise classical discrete probabil-
ity measures. Given a sample space X, the traditional
likelihood function is equal to the conditional probabil-
ity of the data given a parameter θ ∈ Θ, i.e., a family of
probability distribution functions (PDFs) over X param-
eterised by θ: L(θ|X) .= p(X|θ), θ ∈ Θ. As originally
proposed by Shafer and Wasserman [28, 32, 33], belief
functions can indeed be built from traditional likelihood
functions. However, as we argue here, one can directly
define a belief likelihood function, mapping a sample ob-
servation x ∈ X to a real number, as a natural set-valued
generalisation of the conventional likelihood. It is nat-
ural to define such a belief likelihood function as fam-
ily of belief functions on X, BelX(.|θ), parameterised by
θ ∈ Θ. As the latter take values on sets of outcomes,
A ⊂ X, of which singleton outcomes are mere special
cases, they provide a natural setting for computing likeli-
hoods of set-valued observations, in accordance with the
random set philosophy.
When applied to samples generated by series of indepen-
dent trials, under a generalisation of stochastic indepen-
dence, belief likelihoods factorise into simple products.
The resulting lower and upper likelihoods can be easily
computed for series of Bernoulli trials, and allows us to
formulate a generalised logistic regression framework, in
which the mass values of individual trials are constrained
to follow a logistic dependence on scalar parameters.
The values of the parameters which optimise the lower
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and upper likelihoods induce a pair of ‘lower’ and ‘up-
per’ belief functions on the parameter space, whose in-
terval effectively encodes the uncertainty associated with
the amount of data at our disposal. Every new observa-
tion, possibly in areas of the sample space not previously
explored, is mapped to a pair of lower and upper logistic
belief functions, which together provide lower and upper
estimates for the belief values of each event.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of the paper are thus as follows:
(1) a belief likelihood function for repeated trials is de-
fined, whenever the uncertainty on individual trials is as-
sumed to be encoded by a belief measure;
(2) elegant factorisation properties are proven for events
that are Cartesian products, whenever belief measures
are combined by conjunctive rule, leading to the notions
of lower and upper likelihoods;
(3) factorisation results are also provided in the case in
which the dual, disjunctive combination is used to com-
pute belief and plausibility likelihoods;
(4) analitical expressions of lower and upper likelihoods
are provided for the case of Bernoulli trials;
(4) finally, a generalised logistic regression based on
lower and upper likelihoods is formulated and analysed,
as an alternative inference mechanism to generate belief
functions from statistical data.
1.2 Paper outline
After reviewing in Section 2 the logistic regression
framework, we recall in Section 3 the necessary notions
of the theory of belief functions. In Section 4 the belief
likelihood function of repeated trials is defined. In Sec-
tion 5, the belief likelihood of a series of binary trials
is analysed in the conjunctive case. Factorisation results
are shown which reduce upper and lower likelihoods of
‘sharp’ samples to products of belief values of individ-
ual binary observations, and can be generalised to arbi-
trary Cartesian products of focal elements. In Section 6
an analysis of the belief likelihood function in the dis-
junctive case is conducted. General factorisation results
holding for series of observations from arbitrary sample
spaces are illustrated in Section 7, while analytical ex-
pressions for the Bernoulli case are given in Section 8.
Finally, a generalised logistic regression framework is
outlined (Section 9) in which the masses of the two out-
comes are constrained to have a logistic dependency, and
dual optimisation problems lead to a pair of lower and
upper estimates for the belief measure of the outcomes.
Section 10 concludes the paper and points at future work.
2 Logistic regression
Logistic regression allows us, given a sample Y =
{Y1, ..., Yn}, X = {x1, ..., xn} where Yi ∈ {0, 1} is a
binary outcome at time i and xi is the corresponding ob-
served measurement, to learn the parameters of a condi-
tional probability relation between the two, of the form:
P (Y = 1|x) = 1
1 + e−(β0+β1x)
, (1)
where β0 and β1 are two scalar parameters. Given a new
observation x, (1) delivers the probability of a positive
outcome Y = 1. Logistic regression generalises deter-
ministic linear regression, as it is a function of the linear
combination β0+β1x. The n trials are assumed indepen-
dent but not equally distributed, for pii = P (Yi = 1|xi)
varies with the time instant i of collection. The two scalar
parameters β0, β1 in (1) are estimated by maximum like-
lihood of the sample. After denoting by
pii = P (Yi = 1|xi) = 1
1 + e−(β0+β1xi)
,
1− pii = P (Yi = 0|xi) = e
−(β0+β1xi)
1 + e−(β0+β1xi)
(2)
the conditional probabilities of the two outcomes, the
likelihood of the sample can be expressed as: L(β|Y ) =∏n
i=1 pi
Yi
i (1− pii)Yi , where Yi ∈ {0, 1} and pii is a func-
tion of β = [β0, β1]. Maximising L(β|Y ) yields a con-
ditional PDF P (Y = 1|x).
Unfortunately, logistic regression shows clear limitations
when the number of samples is insufficient or when there
are too few positive outcomes (1s) [19]. Moreover, in-
ference by logistic regression tends to underestimate the
probability of a positive outcome [19].
3 Belief functions
3.1 Belief and plausibility measures
Definition 1. A basic probability assignment (BPA) [1]
over a finite domain Θ is a set function [10, 11] m :
2Θ → [0, 1] defined on the collection 2Θ of all subsets of
Θ s.t.:
m(∅) = 0,
∑
A⊂Θ
m(A) = 1.
The quantity m(A) is called the basic probability num-
ber or ‘mass’ [22, 21] assigned to A. The elements of
the power set 2Θ associated with non-zero values of m
are called the focal elements of m.
Definition 2. The belief function (BF) associated with a
basic probability assignment m : 2Θ → [0, 1] is the set
function Bel : 2Θ → [0, 1] defined as:
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B). (3)
The domain Θ on which a belief function is defined is
usually interpreted as the set of possible answers to a
given problem, exactly one of which is the correct one.
For each subset (‘event’) A ⊂ Θ the quantity Bel(A)
takes on the meaning of degree of belief that the truth
lies in A, and represents the total belief committed to a
set of possible outcomes A by the available evidence m.
Another mathematical expression of the evidence gen-
erating a belief function Bel is the upper probability or
plausibility of an event A: Pl(A) .= 1 − Bel(A¯), as
opposed to its lower probability Bel(A) [6]. The corre-
sponding plausibility function Pl : 2Θ → [0, 1] conveys
the same information as Bel, and can be expressed as:
Pl(A) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
m(B) ≥ Bel(A).
3.2 Evidence combination
The issue of combining the belief function representing
our current knowledge state with a new one encoding the
new evidence is central in belief theory. After an initial
proposal by Dempster, several other aggregation opera-
tors have been proposed, based on different assumptions
on the nature of the sources of evidence to combine.
Definition 3. The orthogonal sum or Dempster’s combi-
nation Bel1 ⊕Bel2 : 2Θ → [0, 1] of two belief functions
Bel1 : 2
Θ → [0, 1], Bel2 : 2Θ → [0, 1] defined on the
same domain Θ is the unique BF on Θ with as focal el-
ements all the non-empty intersections of focal elements
of Bel1 and Bel2, and basic probability assignment:
m⊕(A) =
m∩(A)
1−m∩(∅) , (4)
where mi denotes the BPA of the input BF Beli, and:
m∩(A) =
∑
B∩C=Am1(B)m2(C).
Rather than normalising (as in (4)), Smets’ conjunctive
rule leaves the conflicting massm(∅) with the empty set:
m ∩©(A) = m∩(A) ∅ ⊆ A ⊆ Θ, (5)
and is thus applicable to ‘unnormalised’ beliefs [31].
In Dempster’s rule, consensus between two sources is
expressed by the intersection of the supported events.
When the union is taken to express consensus we obtain
the disjunctive rule of combination [20, 34]:
m ∪©(A) =
∑
B∪C=A
m1(B)m2(C), (6)
which yields more cautious inferences than conjunctive
rules, by producing belief functions that are less ‘com-
mitted’, i.e., have larger focal sets. Under disjunctive
combination: Bel1 ∪©Bel2(A) = Bel1(A) · Bel2(A),
input belief values are simply multiplied.
3.3 Conditioning
Belief functions can also be conditioned, rather than
combined, whenever we are presented hard evidence of
the form ‘A is true’ [3, 12, 18, 14, 9, 35, 17].
In particular, Dempster’s combination naturally induces
a conditioning operator. Given a conditioning event A ⊂
Θ, the ‘logical’ (or ‘categorical’, in Smets’ terminology)
belief function BelA such that m(A) = 1 is combined
via Dempster’s rule with the a-priori belief functionBel.
The resulting BF Bel ⊕ BelA is the conditional belief
function givenA a la Dempster, denoted byBel⊕(A|B).
3.4 Multivariate analysis
In many applications, we need to express uncertain in-
formation about a number of distinct variables (e.g., X
and Y ) taking values in different domains (ΘX and ΘY ,
respectively). The reasoning process needs then to take
place in the Cartesian product of the domains associated
with each individual variable.
Let then ΘX and ΘY be two sample spaces associated
with two distinct variables, and let mXY be a mass func-
tion on ΘXY = ΘX × ΘY . The latter can be expressed
in the coarser domain ΘX by transferring each mass
mXY (A) to the projection A ↓ ΘX of A on ΘX . We
obtain a marginal mass function on ΘX , denoted by:
mXY↓X (B)
.
=
∑
{A⊆ΘXY ,A↓ΘX=B}
mXY (A),∀B ⊆ ΘX .
Conversely, a mass function mX on ΘX can be ex-
pressed in ΘX ×ΘY by transferring each mass mX(B)
to the cylindrical extension B↑XY .= B×ΩY of B. The
vacuous extension of mX onto ΘX ×ΘY will then be:
m↑XYX (A)
.
=
{
mX(B) if A = B × ΩY ,
0 otherwise.
(7)
The associated BF is denoted by Bel↑XYX .
4 Belief likelihood of repeated trials
Let BelXi(A|θ), for i = 1, 2, ..., n be a parameterised
family of belief functions on Xi, the space of quantities
that can be observed at time i, depending on a parameter
θ ∈ Θ. A series of repeated trials then assumes values in
X1×· · ·×Xn, whose elements are tuples of the form ~x =
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn. We call such tuples ‘sharp’
samples, as opposed to arbitrary subsets A ⊂ X1×· · ·×
Xn of the space of trials. Note that we are not assuming
the trials to be equally distributed at this stage, nor we
assume that they come from the same sample space.
Definition 4. The belief likelihood function
BelX1×···×Xn : 2
X1×···×Xn → [0, 1] of a series of
repeated trials is defined as:
BelX1×···×Xn(A|θ) .= Bel↑×iXiX1 · · ·Bel
↑×iXi
Xn (A|θ),
(8)
where Bel↑×iXiXj is the vacuous extension (7) of BelXj to
the Cartesian product X1×· · ·×Xn where the observed
tuples live, and  is an arbitrary combination rule.
In particular, when the subset A reduces to a sharp sam-
ple, A = {~x}, we can define the following generalisa-
tions of the notion of likelihood.
Definition 5. We call the quantities
L(~x)
.
= BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}|θ),
L(~x)
.
= PlX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}|θ)
(9)
lower likelihood and upper likelihood, respectively, of
A = {~x} = {(x1, ..., xn)}.
5 Binary trials: the conjunctive case
Belief likelihoods factorise into simple products, when-
ever conjuctive combination is employed (as a generali-
sation of classical stochastic independence) in Definition
4, and trials with binary outcomes are considered.
5.1 Focal elements of the belief likelihood
Let us first analyse the case n = 2. We seek the Demp-
ster’s sum BelX1 ⊕BelX2 , where X1 = X2 = {T, F}.
Figure 1 is a diagram of all the intersections of focal ele-
ments of the two input BF on X1×X2. There are 9 = 32
Figure 1: Graphical representation of Dempster’s com-
bination BelX1 ⊕BelX2 on X1 × X2.
distinct, non-empty intersections, which correspond to
the focal elements ofBelX1⊕BelX2 . According to Equa-
tion (4), the mass of focal element A1 × A2, A1 ⊆ X1,
A2 ⊆ X2, is then:
mBelX1⊕BelX2 (A1 ×A2) = mX1(A1) ·mX2(A2). (10)
Note that the result holds when using the conjunctive rule
∩© as well (5), for none of the intersections is empty,
hence no normalisation is required. Nothing is assumed
about the mass assignment of BelX1 and BelX2 .
We can now prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For any n ∈ Z the belief function BelX1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ BelXn , where Xi = X = {T, F}, has 3n focal
elements, namely all possible Cartesian products A1 ×
...×An of n non-empty subsets Ai of X, with BPA:
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn (A1 × ...×An) =
n∏
i=1
mXi(Ai).
Proof. The proof is by induction. The thesis was shown
to be true for n = 2 in Equation (10). In the induction
step, we assume that the thesis is true for n, and prove it
for n+1. If BelX1 ⊕· · ·⊕BelXn , defined on X1×· · ·×
Xn, has as focal elements the n-products A1 × ... × An
withAi ∈
{{T}, {F},X} for all i, its vacuous extension
to X1×· · ·×Xn×Xn+1 will have as focal elements the
n+ 1-products of the form: A1× ...×An×Xn+1, with
Ai ∈
{{T}, {F},X} for all i.
The belief function BelXn+1 is defined on Xn+1 = X,
with three focal elements: {T}, {F} and X = {T, F}.
Its vacuous extension to X1× · · · ×Xn×Xn+1 thus has
the following three focal elements: X1×· · ·×Xn×{T},
X1 × · · · × Xn × {F} and X1 × · · · × Xn × Xn+1.
When computing (BelX1 ⊕ · · · ⊕BelXn)⊕BelXn+1 on
the common refinementX1×· · ·×Xn×Xn+1 we need to
compute the intersection of their focal elements, namely:(
A1 × ...×An × Xn+1
) ∩ (X1 × · · · × Xn ×An+1)
= A1 × ...×An ×An+1
for all Ai ⊆ Xi, i = 1, ..., n + 1. All such intersections
are distinct for distinct focal elements of the two belief
functions to combine, and there are no empty intersec-
tion. By Dempster’s rule (4) their mass is equal to the
product of the original masses, i.e.:
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn+1 (A1 × ...×An ×An+1) =
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn (A1 × ...×An) ·mBelXn+1 (An+1).
Since we assumed that the factorisation holds for n, the
thesis easily follows.
As no normalisation is involved in the combination
BelX1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ BelXn , Dempster’s rule coincides with
the conjunctive rule and Lemma 1 holds for ∩© as well.
5.2 Factorisation for ‘sharp’ tuples
The following becomes then a simple corollary.
Theorem 1. When using either ∩© or⊕ as a combination
rule in the definition of belief likelihood function, the fol-
lowing decomposition holds for tuples (x1, ..., xn), xi ∈
Xi, which are the singletons elements of X1 × · · · × Xn,
with X1 = ... = Xn = {T, F}:
BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}|θ) =
n∏
i=1
BelXi({xi}|θ),
(11)
Proof. For the singleton elements of X1 × · · · × Xn,
since {(x1, ..., xn)} = {x1} × ... × {xn}, Equation
(11) becomes: BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}) =
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn ({(x1, ..., xn)}) =∏n
i=1mXi({xi}) =
∏n
i=1BelXi({xi}), where the
mass factorisation follows from Lemma 1, as on
singletons mass and belief values coincide.
There is evidence to support the following as well.
Conjecture 1. When using either ∩© or ⊕ as a com-
bination rule in the definition of belief likelihood func-
tion, the following decomposition holds for the associ-
ated plausibility values on tuples (x1, ..., xn), xi ∈ Xi,
which are the singletons elements of X1×· · ·×Xn, with
X1 = ... = Xn = {T, F}:
PlX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}|θ) =
n∏
i=1
PlXi({xi}|θ).
(12)
Indeed we can write: PlX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}) =
= 1−BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}c) =
= 1−
∑
B⊆{(x1,...,xn)}c
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn (B). (13)
By Lemma 1 all the subsets B with non-zero mass are
Cartesian products of the form A1 × ...×An, ∅ 6= Ai ⊆
Xi. We then need understand the nature of the focal ele-
ments of BelX1×···×Xn which are subsets of an arbitrary
singleton complement {(x1, ..., xn)}c.
For binary spaces Xi = X = {T, F}, by definition of
Cartesian product, each such B = A1 × ... × An ⊆
{(x1, ..., xn)}c is obtained by replacing a number 1 ≤
k ≤ n of components of the tuple (x1, ..., xn) = {x1}×
... × {xn} with a different subset of Xi (either {xi}c =
Xi\{xi} orXi). There are
(
n
k
)
such sets of k components
in a list of n. Of these k components, in general 1 ≤ m ≤
k will be replaced by {xi}c, while the other 1 ≤ k−m <
k will be replaced by Xi. Note that not all k components
can be replaced by Xi, since the resulting focal element
would contain the tuple {(x1, ..., xn)} ∈ X1 × ...× Xn.
The following argument can be proved for
(x1, ..., xn) = (T, ..., T ), under the additional assump-
tion that BelX1 · · ·BelXn are equally distributed with
p
.
= BelXi({T}), q .= BelXi({F}) and r .= BelXi(Xi).
If this is the case, for fixed values of m and k all the
resulting focal elements have the same mass value,
namely: pn−kqmrk−m, where p .= BelXi({T}),
q
.
= BelXi({F}) and r .= BelXi(Xi). As there are
exactly
(
k
m
)
such focal elements, (13) can be written as:
1−
n∑
k=1
(
n
k
) k∑
m=1
(
k
m
)
pn−kqmrk−m.
which can be rewritten as:
1−
n∑
m=1
qm
n∑
k=m
(
n
k
)(
k
m
)
pn−krk−m.
A change of variable l = n−k, where l = 0 when k = n,
l = n−m when k = m, allows us to write it as:
1−
n∑
m=1
qm
n−m∑
l=0
(
n
n− l
)(
n− l
m
)
plr(n−m)−l,
since k −m = n− l −m, k = n− l. Now, as(
n
n− l
)(
n− l
m
)
=
(
n
m
)(
n−m
l
)
we obtain: 1−
n∑
m=1
qm
(
n
m
) n−m∑
l=0
(
n−m
l
)
plr(n−m)−l.
By Newton’s binomial, the latter is equal to 1 −
n∑
m=1
qm
(
n
m
)
(1 − q)n−m, since 1 − q = p + r. Again,
by Newton’s binomial, we get:
PlX1×···×Xn({(T, ..., T )}) = 1− [1− (1− q)n]
= (1− q)n =
n∏
i=1
PlXi({T}).
5.3 Factorisation for Cartesian products
Decomposition (11) is equivalent to what Smets calls
conditional conjunctive independence [30]. In fact, for
binary spaces factorisation (11) generalises to all sub-
sets A ⊆ X1 × · · · × Xn of samples which are Carte-
sian products of subsets of X1, ...,Xn, respectively: A =
A1 × · · · ×An, Ai ⊆ Xi for all i.
Corollary 1. WheneverAi ⊆ Xi = {T, F}, i = 1, ..., n,
under conjunctive combination we have that:
BelX1×···×Xn(A1 × · · · ×An|θ) =
n∏
i=1
BelXi(Ai|θ).
(14)
Proof. As by Lemma 1 all the focal elements of
BelX1 ∩©· · · ∩©BelXn are Cartesian products of the form
B = B1 × · · · × Bn, Bi ⊆ Xi, it follows that
BelX1×···×Xn(A1 × · · · ×An|θ) is equal to:∑
B⊆A1×···×An,B=B1×···×Bn
mX1(B1) · ... ·mXn(Bn).
But {B ⊆ A1×· · ·×An, B = B1×· · ·×Bn} = {B =
B1×· · ·×Bn, Bi ⊆ Ai∀i}, since ifBj 6⊂ Aj for some j
the resulting Cartesian product would not be a subset of
A1×· · ·×An. Thus, BelX1×···×Xn(A1×· · ·×An|θ) =
=
∑
B=B1×···×Bn,Bi⊆Ai∀i
mX1(B1)·...·mXn(Bn). (15)
For all Ai’s, i = i1, ..., im that are singletons of Xi, nec-
essarily Bi = Ai and we can write (15) as:
m(Ai1)·...·m(Aim)
∑
Bj⊆Aj ,j 6=i1,...,im
∏
j 6=i1,...,im
mXj (Bj).
If the frames are binary, Xi = {T, F}, those Ai’s that
are not singletons coincide with Xi, so that we have:
m(Ai1) · ... ·m(Aim)
∑
Bj⊆Xj ,j 6=i1,...,im
∏
j
mXj (Bj).
The quantity
∑
Bj⊆Xj ,j 6=i1,...,im
∏
j
mXj (Bj) is, according
to the definition of conjunctive combination, the sum of
the masses of all the possible intersections of (cylindrical
extensions of) focal elements of BelXj , j 6= i1, ..., im,
thus they add up to 1. In conclusion (forgetting the con-
ditioning on θ in the derivation for sake of readability):
BelX1×···×Xn(A1×· · ·×An) = m(Ai1)·...·m(Aim)·1·
... · 1 = BelXi1 (Ai1) · ... ·BelXim (Aim) ·BelXj1 (Xj1) ·
... · BelXjk (Xjk) = BelXi1 (Ai1) · ... · BelXim (Aim) ·
BelXj1 (Aj1) · ... ·BelXjk (Ajk) and we have (14).
Corollary 1 states that conditional conjunctive indepen-
dence always holds for events that are Cartesian prod-
ucts, whenever the involved frames are binary.
6 Binary trials: the disjunctive case
Similar factorisation results hold when using the (more
cautious) disjunctive combination ∪©.
6.1 Structure of the focal elements
As in the conjunctive case, we first analyse the case n =
2. We seek the disjunctive combination BelX1 ∪©BelX2 ,
where each BelXi has as focal elements {T}, {F} and
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the disjunctive
combination BelX1 ∪©BelX2 on X1 × X2.
Xi. Figure 2 is a diagram of all the unions of focal ele-
ments of the two input BFs on their common refinement
X1 × X2. There are 5 = 22 + 1 distinct such unions, the
focal elements of BelX1 ∪©BelX2 , with masses:
m({(xi, xj)}c) = mX1({xi}c) ·mX2({xj}c),
m(X1 × X2) = 1−
∑
i,j
mX1({xi}c) ·mX2({xj}c).
We can now prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The belief function BelX1 ∪©· · · ∪©BelXn ,
where Xi = X = {T, F}, has 2n + 1 focal ele-
ments, namely all the complements of the n-tuples ~x =
(x1, ..., xn) of singleton elements xi ∈ Xi, with BPA:
mBelX1 ∪©··· ∪©BelXn ({(x1, ..., xn)}c) =
= mX1({x1}c) · · · · ·mXn({xn}c), (16)
plus the Cartesian productX1×· · ·×Xn itself, with mass
value given by normalisation.
Proof. The proof is by induction. The case n = 2 was
proven above. In the induction step, we assume that the
thesis is true for n, namely that the focal elements of
BelX1 ∪©· · · ∪©BelXn have the form:
A = {(x1, ..., xn)}c = {(x′1, ..., x′n)|∃i : {x′i} = {xi}c},
(17)
where xi ∈ Xi = X. We need to prove it true for n+ 1.
The vacuous extension of (17) has trivially the form:
A′ = {(x′1, ..., x′n, xn+1)|∃i : {x′i} = {xi}c, xn+1 ∈ X}.
Note that only 2 = |X| singletons of X1 × · · · × Xn+1
are not in A′, for any given tuple (x1, ..., xn).
The vacuous extension to X1 × · · · × Xn+1 of a focal
element B = {xn+1} of BelXn+1 is instead:
B′ = {(y1, · · · , yn, xn+1)|yi ∈ X ∀i = 1, ..., n}.
Now, all the elements of B′, except for
(x1, ..., xn, xn+1), are also elements of A′. Hence,
the union A′ ∪ B′ reduces to the union of A′ and
(x1, ..., xn, xn+1). The only singleton element
of X1 × · · · × Xn+1 not in A′ ∪ B′ is there-
fore (x1, ..., xn, x′n+1), {x′n+1} = {xn+1}c, for
it is neither in A′ nor in B′. All such unions are
distinct. Thus, by definition of ∪©, their mass is
m({(x1, ..., xn)}c) · m({xn+1}c) which by inductive
hypothesis is equal to (16). Unions involving either
Xn+1 or X1 × · · · × Xn are equal to X1 × · · · × Xn+1
by the property of the union operator.
6.2 Factorisation
Theorem 2. In the hypotheses of Lemma 2, when us-
ing disjunctive combination ∪© in the definition of belief
likelihood function, the following decomposition holds:
BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}c|θ) =
n∏
i=1
BelXi({xi}c|θ).
(18)
Proof. As {(x1, ..., xn)}c contains only itself as a focal
element:
BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}c|θ) = m({(x1, ..., xn)}c|θ).
By Lemma 2 the latter becomes
BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}c|θ)
=
n∏
i=1
mXi({xi}c|θ) =
n∏
i=1
BelXi({xi}c|θ),
as {xi}c is a singleton element of Xi, and we have (18).
Note that PlX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}c|θ) = 1 for
all tuples (x1, ..., xn), as the set {(x1, ..., xn)}c has
non-empty intersection with all the focal elements of
BelX1 ∪©· · · ∪©BelXn .
7 General factorisation results
The argument of Lemma 1 is in fact valid for the con-
junctive combination of belief functions defined on an
arbitrary collection X1, ...,Xn of finite spaces.
Theorem 3. For any n ∈ Z the belief function BelX1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ BelXn , where X1, ...,Xn are finite spaces, has as
focal elements all the Cartesian products A1 × ... × An
of n focal elements A1 ⊆ X1, ..., An ⊆ Xn, with BPA:
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn (A1 × ...×An) =
n∏
i=1
mXi(Ai).
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and is omitted
for lack of space. It follows that:
Corollary 2. When using either ∩© or ⊕ as a combi-
nation rule in the definition of belief likelihood function,
the following decomposition holds for tuples (x1, ..., xn),
xi ∈ Xi, which are the singletons elements of X1×· · ·×
Xn, with X1, ...,Xn any finite frames of discernment:
BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}|θ) =
n∏
i=1
BelXi({xi}|θ).
(19)
Proof. For the singleton elements of X1 × · · · × Xn,
since {(x1, ..., xn)} = {x1} × ... × {xn}, Equation
(19) becomes: BelX1×···×Xn({(x1, ..., xn)}) =
mBelX1⊕···⊕BelXn ({(x1, ..., xn)}) =∏n
i=1mXi({xi}) =
∏n
i=1BelXi({xi}), where the
mass factorisation follows from Theorem 3, as on
singletons mass and belief values coincide.
8 Lower and upper likelihoods of
Bernoulli trials
In the case of Bernoulli trials, where not only there is a
single binary sample space, Xi = X = {T, F} and con-
ditional independence holds, but the random variables
are assumed equally distributed, the conventional like-
lihood reads as pk(1− p)n−k, where p = P (T ), k is the
number of successes (T ) and n the total number of trials.
Let us then compute the lower likelihood function for a
series of Bernoulli trials, under the assumption that all
the BFs BelXi = BelX, i = 1, ..., n, coincide (the anal-
ogous of equidistribution), with BelX parameterised by
p = m({T}), q = m({F}) (where, this time, p+q ≤ 1).
Corollary 3. Under the above assumptions, the lower
and upper likelihoods of the sample ~x = (x1, ..., xn) are:
L(~x) =
n∏
i=1
BelX({xi}) = pkqn−k;
L(~x) =
n∏
i=1
PlX({xi}) = (1− q)k(1− p)n−k.
(20)
The above decomposition for L(~x), in particular, is valid
under the assumption that Conjecture 1 holds, at least for
Bernoulli trials, as the evidence seems to suggest.
After normalisation, these can be seen as probability dis-
tribution functions (PDFs) over the (belief) space B of all
belief functions definable on X [5, 7, 8].
Having observes a series of trials, ~x = (x1, ..., xn), xi ∈
{T, F}, one may then seek the belief function on X =
{T, F} which best describes the observed sample, i.e.,
the optimal values of the two parameters p and q.
Figure 3: Lower (top) and upper (bottom) likelihood
functions plotted over the space of belief functions on
X = {T, F}, parameterised by p = m(T ) (X axis) and
q = m(F ) (Y axis), for the case of k = 6 successes over
n = 10 trials.
Figure 3 plots the both lower and upper likelihoods (20)
for the case of k = 6 successes over n = 10 trials.
Both subsume the traditional likelihood pk(1 − p)n−k,
as their section for p + q = 1, although this is particu-
larly visible for the lower likelihood (top). In particular,
the maximum of the lower likelihood is the traditional
ML estimate p = k/n, q = 1 − p. This makes sense,
for the lower likelihood is highest for the most com-
mitted belief functions (i.e., for probability measures).
The upper likelihood (bottom) has a unique maximum in
p = q = 0: this is the vacuous belief function on {T, F},
with m({T, F}) = 1.
The interval of belief functions joining maxL with
maxL is the set of belief functions such that pq =
k
n−k ,
i.e., those which preserve the ratio between the observed
empirical counts.
9 Generalising logistic regression
Based on Theorem 1 and Conjecture 1, we can also gen-
eralise logistic regression (Section 2) to a belief function
setting by replacing the conditional probability (pii, 1 −
pii) onX = {T, F}with a belief function (pi = m({T}),
qi = m({F}), pi + qi ≤ 1) on 2X.
Note that, just as in a traditional logistic regression set-
ting (Section 2), the belief functionsBeli associated with
different input values xi are not equally distributed.
After writing T = 1, F = 0, the lower and upper likeli-
hoods can be expressed as:
L(β|Y ) =
n∏
i=1
pYii q
1−Yi
i ,
L(β|Y ) =
n∏
i=1
(1− qi)Yi(1− pi)1−Yi .
The question becomes how to generalise the logit link
between observations x and outputs y, in order to seek
an analytical mapping between observations and belief
functions over a binary frame. Just assuming:
pi = P (Yi = 1|xi) = 1
1 + e−(β0+β1xi)
, (21)
as in the classical contraint (2), does not yield any ana-
lytical dependency for qi. To address this issue we can,
for instance, add a parameter β2 such that the following
relationship holds:
qi = m(Yi = 0|xi) = β2 e
−(β0+β1xi)
1 + e−(β0+β1xi)
. (22)
We can then seek lower and upper optimal estimates for
the parameter vector β = [β0, β1, β2]′:
arg max
β
L 7→ β
0
, β
1
, β
2
, arg max
β
L 7→ β0, β1, β2.
(23)
Plugging these optimal parameters into (21), (22) will
then yield a lower and an upper family of conditional
belief functions given x (i.e., an interval of belief func-
tions):
BelX(.|β, x), BelX(.|β, x).
Given any new test observation x′, this generalised logis-
tic regression method will then output a pair of lower and
upper belief functions on X = {T, F}, as opposed to a
sharp probability value as in the classical framework. As
each belief function itself provides a lower and an upper
probability for each event, both the lower and the upper
regressed BFs will provide an interval for the probability
P (T ) of success, whose width will reflect the uncertainty
encoded by the training set of sample series.
9.1 Optimisation
The problems (23) are both constrained optimisation
ones (contrarily to the classical case, where qi = 1 − pi
and the optimisation problem is unconstrained).
Indeed, the parameter vector β must be such that:
0 ≤ pi + qi ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Fortunately the number of constraints can be reduced by
noticing that, if pi and qi have the analytical forms (21)
and (22), respectively, then pi+qi ≤ 1 for all iwhenever
β2 ≤ 1.
The objective function can also be simplified by taking
the logarithm. In the lower likelihood case we get1:
logL(β|Y ) =
n∑
i=1
{
− log(1 + e−(β0+β1xi))
+(1− Yi)
[
log β2 − (β0 + β1xi)
]}
.
We then need to analyse the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
necessary conditions for the optimality of the solution of
a nonlinear optimisation problem arg maxx f(x) subject
to differentiable constraints: gi(x) ≤ 0 i = 0, ..., n.
If x∗ is a local optimum, under some regularity condi-
tions then there exist constants µi, (i = 0, . . . , n), called
KKT multipliers, such that the following conditions hold:
1. ∇f(x∗)−∑mi=1 µi∇gi(x∗) = 0 (Stationarity);
2. Primal feasibility: gi(x∗) ≤ 0 for all i = 0, . . . , n;
3. Dual feasibility: µi ≥ 0 for all i = 0, . . . , n;
4. Complementary slackness: µigi(x∗) = 0 for all i.
In our case the constraints are:
β1 ≤ 1 ≡ g0 = β2 − 1 ≤ 0;
pi + qi ≥ 0 ≡ gi = −β2 − eβ0+β1xi ≤ 0
i = 1, ..., n, and the Lagrangian becomes:
Λ(β) = logL(β)+µ0(β2−1)−
n∑
i=1
µi(β2 +e
β0+β1xi).
The stationarity conditions thus read as∇Λ(β) = 0, i.e.:
n∑
i=1
[
(1− pi)− (1− Yi)− µieβ0+β1xi
]
= 0,
n∑
i=1
[
(1− pi)− (1− Yi)− µieβ0+β1xi
]
xi = 0,
n∑
i=1
(
1− Yi
β2
− µi
)
+ µ0 = 0,
(24)
1Derivations are omitted due to lack of space.
where, as usual, pi is as in (21).
Complementary slackness reads instead as follows:{
µ0(β2 − 1) = 0,
µi(β2 + e
β0+β1xi) = 0, i = 1, ..., n.
(25)
Standard gradient descent methods can be applied to the
above systems of equations to get the optimal parameters
of our generalised logistic regressor. Similar calculations
hold for the upper likelihood problem. A multi-objective
optimisation setting in which the lower likelihood is min-
imised as the upper likelihood is maximised can be envis-
aged, to generate the most cautious interval of estimates.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, stimulated by the inability of logistic re-
gression to encode uncertainty induced by scarcity of
samples in certain areas of the sample space, and in-
ference mechanisms for belief measures which take the
classical likelihood function at face value, we defined a
belief likelihood function for repeated trials, as an infer-
ence methodology both more in line with the random set
philosophy of inherently set-valued observations, and ca-
pable of allowing a promising generalisation of logistic
regression. We analysed the factorisation properties of
the belief likelihood function when either conjunctive or
disjunctive combination is applied, in particular for the
case of binary spaces, and computed the lower and up-
per likelihoods of series of Bernoulli trials. Eventually,
we proposed a generalised logistic regression framework
which leads to a pair of dual constrained optimisation
problems, which can be solved by standard methods.
A number of interesting research lines lie ahead. Among
others, a systematic comparison with other approaches
to belief function inference, or the computation of be-
lief and plausibility likelihood for other major combina-
tion rules. As far as generalised logistic regression is
concerned, different parameterisations of the belief func-
tions involved need to be explored. A comprehensive
testing of the robustness of the generalised framework in
standard estimation problems, including rare event anal-
ysis, needs to be conducted to validate this new proce-
dure. The method, unlike traditional ones, can naturally
cope with missing data (represented by vacuous obser-
vations xi = X), therefore providing a robust framework
for logistic regression which can deal with incomplete
series of observations.
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